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Part III: Zoning Aesthetics
Chapter 5: The Takings Clause and Signs
The Takings Issue in Billboard Control
Charles F. Floyd*
“It is not speculative to recognize that billboards by their very
nature, wherever located and however constructed, can be perceived
as an esthetic harm.”1
The extent that billboards should be permitted in a community
often raises vehement policy and legal arguments. The outdoor
advertising industry argues that billboards are an effective, low cost
method of delivering an advertising message to a large number of
people. Others, however, agree with the U.S. Supreme Court and
consider them an “esthetic harm,” a harm they believe should be
reduced or eliminated.
Communities desiring to reduce billboard clutter face a number of
legal obstacles, particularly issues of free speech and takings. This
article focuses on the latter— does the forced removal of billboards
after a period of time, a process commonly called amortization,
constitute a constitutional “taking” of the outdoor advertising
company’s property? Are there other ways to achieve this objective?
What legislative impediments have been placed in the path of
communities that want to reduce the number of billboards along their
streets and highways?
I. THE OUTDOOR ADVERTISING INDUSTRY
Billboards, more properly referred to as off-premise outdoor
advertising signs, must be distinguished from on-premise signs. The
* Professor Emeritus, Terry College of Business, The University of Georgia.
1. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 510 (1981) (White, J.).
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on-premise sign is an integral part of the business where it is located
and serves to index the business environment, that is, to inform
potential customers where they can find various goods and services.
The off-premise advertising sign, on the other hand, is designed to
use the roadside environment to advertise a good or service found at
some other location.
A. Types of Off-Premise Signs
Off-premise signs can be subdivided into several different
categories. Some billboards provide directional information to
motorists while others feature product advertising. Directional signs
usually are located in rural areas and on urban highways with large
volumes of long-distance travelers, while billboards featuring product
advertising are located primarily, but not exclusively in urban areas.
Off-premise signs can also be subdivided into standardized and
nonstandardized industries. The latter consists primarily of
advertiser-owned billboards giving information regarding tourist and
other highway related services. These nonstandardized signs come in
a great variety of sizes, but are generally smaller than those erected
by the standardized industry.
B. Posters and Bulletins
The firms comprising the standardized outdoor advertising
industry own outdoor advertising structures and sell billboard space
to advertisers. They employ two basic types of signs, poster panels
and painted bulletins.
The poster panel is designed for the posting of paper “bills”—
hence the name “billboard” that is now commonly applied to all off-
premise outdoor advertising signs. The standardized poster panel is
three hundred square feet in size (twelve by twenty-five feet),
although the industry also uses a smaller poster panel of seventy-two
square feet (six by twelve feet), appropriately called a junior panel or
eight-sheet poster.2
2. KEN SAMMON, PLANNING FOR OUT-OF-HOME MEDIA (1987).
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The second type of standardized industry sign is the painted
bulletin usually measuring fourteen feet by forty-eight feet (672
square feet), although various other sizes are also used, particularly
ten feet by forty feet (four hundred square feet) and ten feet by thirty-
six feet (thirty-six hundred square feet). The industry also offers a
“Super Bulletin” of twelve hundred square feet (twenty feet by sixty
feet) in some large markets, and a few bulletins range in size to
twenty-five hundred square feet or even larger. Most bulletins are
painted, but increasingly advertisers are providing printed plastic
faces to the outdoor advertising companies.
C. Ground Leases
Outdoor advertising firms normally do not own the land under
their billboards but lease the ground. These leases vary greatly in
length, from as little as month-to-month to as long as twenty years.
The most common length is perhaps five years, with one five year
extension at the option of the outdoor advertising company. Since
most landowners do not want to tie up their land for long periods,
billboard ground leases commonly contain a clause permitting the
lessor to cancel the lease if the land is needed for development.
D. The Nature of Billboard Structures
Billboard ground leases commonly state that signs located on the
property are personal property trade fixtures. Other leases do not
specifically characterize the billboards as trade fixtures or personal
property, but they almost always state that the signs remain the
property of the outdoor advertising company and can be removed at
the expiration of the term of the lease. This clearly shows the intent
that the signs are not permanently attached to the land.3
Except in a few states that rely on the particular provisions of their
state’s revenue law to tax billboards as real property, billboards in
3. For cases that ruled that billboards are personal property, see Hernando County v.
Anderson, 737 So. 2d 569, (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); City of Norton Stores v. Whiteco
Metrocom, 517 N.W.2d 872 (Mich. Ct. App., 1994); Bilo v. Acme, 765 S.W.2d 12, (Ark. Ct.
App., 1989); Manderson & Assoc., Inc. v. Gore, 389 S.E.2d 251 (Ga. Ct. App., 1989; Aquafine
Corp. v. Fendig Outdoor Adver. Co., 272 S.E.2d 526 (Ga. Ct. App., 1980).
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almost all states are taxed as personal property.4 The outdoor
advertising industry zealously guards this classification. For example,
relying on a New Jersey Attorney General’s opinion, Galloway
Township taxed the R.C. Maxwell Company’s billboards as real
property. The outdoor advertising company, supported by an amicus
brief from the New Jersey Outdoor Advertising Association
contended the signs: (1) were personal property, not real property, (2)
were not “improvements” to the real estate, but “personal property
affixed to the real property,” (3) could be removed “without material
injury to the real property,” (4) could be removed “without material
injury to the personal property itself,” and (5) were “not intended to
be affixed permanently to the real property.” The industry also
indicated that normally the face was not damaged at all when it was
moved and that about eighty percent of the remainder of the structure
could be used at other locations. The New Jersey Supreme Court
agreed with the industry.5
The outdoor advertising industry also sued the Internal Revenue
Service to have their signs declared as “tangible personal property,”
making them eligible for the investment tax credit that only applied
to personal property. They won.6 As I show later, the issue of whether
billboards are personal property or real property is of crucial
importance to the takings controversy.
E. Billboards as a Use of the Road
The question of whether billboards are a use of the road or a use
of private property also is of great significance to the takings issue.
The outdoor advertising industry sells exposure opportunities based
on the number of vehicles passing sign locations. In other words, they
depend solely on the traffic that is produced by the public’s
4. For the exceptions, see Western Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Board of Review of Mills
County, 364 N.W.2d 256 (Iowa 1985); Missouri ex rel. Thompson v. Osage Outdoor Adver.,
674 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Metromedia, Inc. v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 455
N.E.2d 1252 (N.Y. 1983).
5. R.C. Maxwell Co. v. Galloway Township, 679 A.2d 141 (N.J. 1996).
6. Alabama Displays, Inc. v. United States, 507 F.2d 844 (Ct. Cl. 1974); National
Advertising Co. of United States, 507 F.2d 850 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Whiteco Indus., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 65 T.C. 664 (1975).
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investment in roads and highways for their “circulation.” Thus,
although billboards are located on private property, their value to the
outdoor advertising business comes from the use of the public road
not of private property. The only “use” of a billboard occurs where
the reflected image meets the eye, on the road; no good or service is
provided at the location of the sign.
F. Direct or Indirect Use of the Roadways
The outdoor advertising industry contends that billboards benefit
from the roads in the same fashion as do all highway-oriented
business such as motels, restaurants, service stations, and even
businesses in general. This argument ignores the difference between
direct and indirect uses of the roads.
Many types of businesses gain advantages from their close
proximity to major highways, and particularly from nearness to
important roadway junctions or interchanges. These considerations
are a major factor in locational decisions, either because firms depend
on motorists for clientele or because they need easy access to roads
for the transportation of goods. While quite important to many firms,
these benefits are still indirectly derived and are almost impossible to
measure with any degree of accuracy. The highway billboard
business, on the other hand, benefits directly and solely from its use
of the roadway and in direct relationship to the volume of traffic on
the road. As discussed above, the outdoor advertising industry
recognizes this direct relationship in its pricing policies.
II. THE VIEW FROM THE COURTS
The courts have long recognized the fact that the billboard
business is a use of the public’s investment in the roadways rather
than a use of private property. A very early case pointed out this
obvious fact:
The success of billboard advertising depends not so much upon
the use of private property as it does upon the use of the
channels of travel used by the general public. Suppose that the
owner of private property, who so vigorously objects to the
restriction of this form of advertising, should require the
Washington University Open Scholarship
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advertiser to paste his posters upon the billboards so that they
would face the interior of the property instead of the exterior.
Billboard advertising would die a natural death if this were
done, and its real dependency not upon the unrestricted use of
private property but upon the unrestricted use of the public
highways is at once apparent. Ostensibly located on private
property, the real and sole value of the billboard is its
proximity to the public thoroughfares.7
In upholding the state’s Outdoor Advertising Control Law, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court also pointed to the billboard’s use of
the roadway:
[The outdoor advertising business] depends entirely for its
success upon the occupation of places along the sides of
highways and near parks and similar public places. Billboards
are designed to compel attention. The advertising matter
displayed upon them in words, pictures, or devices is
conspicuous, obtrusive and ostentatious, being designed to
intrude forcefully and persistently upon the observation and
attention of all who come within the range of clear normal
vision. The only real value of a sign or billboard lies in its
proximity to the public thoroughfares within public view. In
this respect the plaintiffs are not exercising a natural right; they
are seizing for private benefit an opportunity created for quite a
different purpose by the expenditure of public money in the
construction public ways and the acquisition and improvement
of public parks and reservations.8
The importance of use of the road to outdoor advertising also was
emphasized by New York’s highest court in a case which involved
the forced removal of a billboard along the Thruway for safety
reasons:
7. Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. Rpt. 580, 609 (Phil. 1915), appeal dismissed, 248 U.S.
591 (1918).
8. General Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Department of Public Works, 193 N.E. 799 (Mass.
1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936).
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[I]t is to be borne in mind that it was the very construction of
the Thruway which created the element of value in the land
abutting the road. Billboards and other advertising signs are
obviously of no use unless there is a highway to bring the
traveler within view of them.9
This view of billboards as a use of the roadway was reiterated in a
California case:
Most of respondents’ arguments relating to their “use” of the
land upon which their signs are located are mere exercises in
sophistry, for in no real sense are the signs “used” upon the
land on which they are located. . . [T]he signs are used in a
realistic sense only where the light reflected therefrom strikes
the eyes of the users of the public streets or adjoining private
property.10
In a more recent amortization case, Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v.
Berle, the court stated:
Billboards and advertising signs are of little value and small
use unless great highways bring the traveling public within
view of them, and their enhanced value when they are seen by
a large number of people was created by the State in the
construction of the roads and not by the signs’ owners.11
III. BANNING NEW BILLBOARDS
The first and most essential step in reducing billboard clutter in a
community is enacting a partial or total ban on the erection of new
billboards. Not only will this keep billboards off new roads, it will
reduce the number of billboards in other areas as existing signs are
taken down to make way for expanded development or when signs
are destroyed by storms or other similar occurrences. A ban on new
billboards may also encourage outdoor advertising companies to
agree to take down older signs that are considered objectionable by
9. New York State Thruway Auth. v. Ashley Motor Court, 176 N.E.2d 566 (N.Y. 1961).
10. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of Pasadena, 216 Cal. App. 2d 270 (1963).
11. Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 55 A.D. 2d 340 (1977).
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the community in return for being allowed to erect a limited number
of new signs.
A. Does the Forced Removal of Non-conforming Billboards Violate
the Fifth Amendment?
Can communities force outdoor advertising firms to remove non-
conforming billboards after a reasonable period of time without
triggering a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment? The termination of
non-conforming uses has long been a contentious issue in American
land use law, particularly with regard to billboards. It also is one that
is bitterly contested by the outdoor advertising industry.
An extensive discussion of the general takings issue is beyond the
scope of this article, but certain aspects are central to this inquiry:
· Does amortization involve a physical invasion of the
property?
· What is the proper unit of analysis?
· What are the property interests subject to a “taking?”
· Does amortization go “too far” in regulating billboards,
thereby creating a compensable taking?
B. Physical Invasion of Property
One type of governmental action that involves a categorical taking
occurs when a property owner is compelled to suffer a physical
invasion of his property. Thus, when New York City required that
apartment house owners allow television cable companies to install
cables in their buildings, this was deemed a taking.12
Does amortization of non-conforming billboards involve a
physical invasion of property? No. The governmental entity does not
take possession of the personal property billboard structure. It merely
requires that it be removed. The billboard remains the property of the
outdoor advertising company. For example, in Major Media of the
Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, the Court noted that “the city has
no intention of seizing non-conforming billboards, and plaintiff will
12. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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be able to salvage at least parts of those structures and use them
elsewhere.”13
C. Proper Unit of Analysis
Another question that is critical to the billboard amortization issue
is what constitutes the proper unit of analysis. Is it those billboards
that must be removed under the ordinance or the entire business of
the company?
In 1978 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld New York City’s
Landmarks Preservation Law.14 The Penn Central Transportation Co.
had leased the air rights above its 1913, Beaux-Arts, Grand Central
Terminal for a proposed fifty-five-story office tower, but the
Landmarks Commission rejected the plan, calling it “an aesthetic
joke” that “would reduce the landmark itself to the status of a
curiosity.”15
Penn Central challenged the constitutionality of the Landmarks
Law, contending that historic preservation was not a legitimate state
interest and that the law resulted in the taking of private property
without compensation. The Court disagreed. It found that although
Penn Central could continue to use its property exactly as it had been
used, the Landmarks Law would prevent the building of the office
tower, and Penn Central would lose millions of dollars in future
revenue from this source. This did not result in a taking, however,
because the focus was not on what the regulation took but what
valuable uses remained. In other words, a property owner cannot
establish a regulating taking “simply by showing that they have been
denied the ability to exploit a property interest that they heretofore
had believed was available for development.”
Of great importance to this article’s inquiry regarding
amortization of billboards, the decision established the principle that
in order to determine whether a regulation involves a taking, one
must examine how the regulation affects the property as a whole, not
13. Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 621 F. Supp. 1446, 1453
(E.D.N.C. 1985), affd., 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1102 (1987).
14. Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
15. Id. at 117-18.
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just a piece of the parcel. The Court states: “‘Taking’ jurisprudence
does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to
determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated.”16
Thus, in analyzing the impact of a billboard amortization
regulation, one must examine the economic impact on the entire
property of the outdoor advertising company, or at least the
company’s property in the entire market area, not just the portion that
is affected by the regulation.
Another relevant takings case involved not the regulation of land
but a prohibition on the sale or trade of parts of certain species of
endangered birds.17 The Supreme Court held there was no taking,
even though owners were forbidden to sell parts legally purchased or
otherwise obtained before the regulations became effective. The
plaintiffs had been denied the most profitable uses of their property,
but it was not clear that the property had lost all economic value. The
Court stated: “a property restriction— unaccompanied by a physical
invasion— provides a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim.
A reduction in the value of property is not necessarily equated with a
taking.”18 Here again, the Court ruled that the property rights at issue
needed to be analyzed as a whole, not just one element of those
rights.
In still another case, the Supreme Court restated the principle that
in determining whether a taking had occurred, it was necessary to
examine the property as a whole.19 A Pennsylvania law prohibited
coal mining that would cause damage under existing public buildings,
dwellings, and cemeteries. The companies presented evidence that
the act would force them to leave some twenty-seven million tons of
coal unmined to support the ground above. Since this coal had
significant value that was destroyed one hundred percent, they argued
this constituted a taking. The Court disagreed, holding that one
cannot segment property in order to conclude that all economically
viable use of that particular segment has been destroyed. “The 27
16. Id. at 130.
17. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
18. Id. at 66.
19. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
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million tons of coal do not constitute a separate segment of property
for takings law purposes.”20 When the property was analyzed as a
whole, the companies could still mine approximately ninety-eight
percent of their coal. An economically viable use remained. The
statute did not make coal mining unprofitable or interfere with the
companies’ investment-backed expectations.
This principle has been applied to billboard amortization
regulations. For example, when Naegele Outdoor challenged
Durham, North Carolina’s ordinance, the court ruled that the proper
unit of analysis was the company’s entire business in the area, not
just the billboards that had to be removed:
Clearly the unit is not composed of the affected billboards,
which, like the coal pillars in Keystone, do not constitute a
separate segment of property for taking purposes. . .. [S]ince
the reality of Naegele’s business is that Naegele combines the
leasehold interests in its signs into a unit in selling outdoor
advertising in the Durham area, it follows that the unit of
property to be considered for takings purposes is the combined
group of Durham metro area signs.21
D. Loss of Beneficial Use
The Supreme Court has handed down several additional decisions
regarding how far a regulation could go in affecting property values.
Agins owned five acres of unimproved land overlooking San
Francisco Bay. The City of Tiburon enacted a zoning ordinance that
restricted density on the tract to between one and five single-family
residences, and Agins sued, asserting that the city had effectively
taken the value of their property. In upholding the ordinance, the
Court first stated a general rule which remains the overriding
principle: “The application of a general zoning law to a particular
property effects a taking if (1) the ordinance does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests, or (2) denies an owner
20. Id. at 198.
21. Naegele Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Durham, 803 F. Supp. 1068, 1074 (M.D.N.C.
1992).
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economically viable use of his land.”22
In this case the Court felt the open-space zoning ordinance
protected “the residents of Tiburon from the ill-effects of
urbanization,” a “legitimate governmental goal.” Furthermore, the
property owners were not denied “economically viable use” of their
land because it could still be developed for residential purposes,
albeit not a the density that Agins preferred. The Agins decision
established the general rule for land use regulation in the United
States: if a regulation advances a legitimate state interest, its negative
impact on the value of a property does not require compensation as
long as the owner is left with “an economically viable use.”
In a case that overturned the longstanding presumption that
regulations considered critical to public health or safety were immune
to any takings claim, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that in cases of a
total value loss caused by a challenged regulation, the government
may avoid payment only if the prohibited uses were never part of the
owner’s title. In 1986, David Lucas purchased two residential ocean-
front lots on the Isle of Palms in South Carolina, the last two vacant
lots in the area. Two years later, however, the State enacted a
beachfront management act that had the effect of prohibiting Lucas
from building any habitable structure on his properties. Lucas sued,
contending that although the act was a valid exercise of the State’s
police powers, its application had destroyed the value of his property,
and entitled him to compensation.
The trial court agreed, holding that the prohibition on building
deprived Lucas of any reasonable economic use of the lots and
rendered them valueless.23 The South Carolina Supreme Court
reversed this decision, however, ruling that when a regulation was
enacted “to prevent serious public harm,” no compensation was owed
under the taking clause, regardless of the regulation’s effect on the
property’s value.24
In its decision, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that in
cases of a total value loss caused by the challenged regulation, the
22. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
23. Id. at 1009.
24. Id. at 1009-10.
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government may avoid payment only if the prohibited uses were
never part of the owner’s title:
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land
of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist
compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the
nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use
interests were not part of his title to begin with. . .. [W]e think
the notion pressed by the Council that title is somehow held
subject to “implied limitation” that the State may subsequently
eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent with the
historical compact recorded in the Taking Clause that has
become part of our constitutional culture.25 In other words, if
the government is simply prohibiting by regulation a use that
was always prohibited by principles of nuisance and property
law in that state, then the property owner had never really lost
anything and no taking had occurred. The decision also
contained an important statement of law that is of critical
importance to the personal property billboard amortization
issue: “In the case of personal property, by reason of the
State’s traditionally high degree of control over commercial
dealing, [the property owner] ought to be aware of the
possibility that new regulation might even render his property
economically worthless.”26
In one of the first cases that applied the Lucas decision to
billboard regulation, a Burlington, Iowa billboard amortization
ordinance was upheld. Outdoor Graphics had purchased a number of
billboards in residential areas that had long been non-conforming and
subject to removal. When the City required that the signs be
removed, the billboard company sued, charging that the regulation
constituted a taking of their property because it denied them all
economically beneficial use. The court disagreed, holding that
Outdoor Graphics purchased the property knowing the signs were
subject to removal. Thus, their continued use was never part of their
25. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
26. Id. at 1028.
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property rights and there was no taking.27
In a related case, when the Barton Wilson Company was required
to remove a number of signs in Louisville, Kentucky, they sued,
charging, violations of free speech and takings. The court upheld the
ordinance on both counts. Regarding the takings claim, the court
noted that approximately eighty percent of Wilson’s business was
outside Louisville. Wilson could market the remainder of his
inventory in these areas. “Even if he could not, a 20 percent decrease
in the value of his inventory does not necessarily constitute a taking.
The Court should view the owner’s property as a whole, not in
parcels.”28 The Court went further, however, noting that even if it
could be shown there was a total loss of value, “it is questionable
whether the ordinance would constitute a taking. . .. The Supreme
Court has stated that it is unlikely that an owner of personal property
who has a reasonable expectation that its property will be regulated,
or regulated further as is the case here, would have a takings claim.”29
An opposing, distinctly-minority judicial view was expressed by
the Michigan Court of Appeals.30 The court ruled that the provision
in the East Lansing sign ordinance requiring non-conforming signs to
be removed after a twelve-year amortization period was an
unconstitutional taking. It brushed aside the Supreme Court’s dicta
that regulations that might make personal property worthless were
not a taking, holding that the ordinance “took” Adams Outdoor’s real
property leasehold interest:
The property interests claimed to have been taken by East
Lansing’s sign code are Adams’ real property interests,
whether leasehold or fee simple, in the places where its
billboards are located. East Lansing’s argument that no taking
occurred because the billboards are personal property
misapprehends the nature of the property interest claimed to
have been taken in this case and is therefore rejected. The
Court also refused to regard all of Adams’ billboards in the
market area as the unit of property, rather considering it to be
27. Outdoor Graphics v. City of Burlington, 103 F.3d 690, (8th Cir. 1996).
28. Barton Wilson v. City of Louisville, 957 F. Supp. 948 (W.D. Ky. 1997).
29. Id. at 955.
30. Adams Outdoor v. City of East Lansing, 591 N.W.2d 404 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
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each individual ground leasehold. At this writing, the case is
under appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.31
E. The Statute of Limitations Issue
A favored litigation tactic employed by outdoor advertising
companies when challenging the validity of amortization provisions
in sign ordinances has been to wait until the expiration of the
amortization period before bringing suit. This strategy had two
principal objectives. First, it kept the non-conforming signs up and
still earning income during the pendency of the litigation. Second, by
dragging out any resolution of the issue for a number of years, the
chances of reaching a compromise favorable to the outdoor
advertising company was increased. However, the success of this
tactic has been greatly reduced in recent years, if not eliminated, by
successful application of the statute of limitations.
The issue here was whether any potential “harm” to the outdoor
advertising company would begin at the time the ordinance was
passed or when the amortization period expired. Both Federal and
state courts have ruled in recent years that any potential harm begins
when the ordinance is passed. For example:
Any injury to plaintiff’s property occurred at the time the
statute was enacted. Enactment of the zoning ordinance made
plaintiff’s billboards nonconforming, thereby subjecting them
to removal after the amortization period of seven years. As of
[the date of passage of the ordinance], the consequences of the
existence of nonconforming billboards were conclusively set,
and the expected useful life of plaintiff’s billboards was
shortened.32 Thus, the ordinance must be challenged within a
relatively short period of time, not at the end of the
amortization period.33
31. 1999 Mich. LEXIS 2748 (Mich. Nov. 30, 1999).
32. Naegele Outdoor v. City of Winston-Salem, 457 S.E.2d 874, 875 (N.C. 1995).
33. See also National Adver. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, (4th Cir. 1991);
Lamar Adver. of Mobile, Inc. v. City of Lakeland, 980 F. Supp. 1455 (M.D. Fl. 1997); Capitol
Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 446 S.E.2d 289 (N.C. 1994).
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IV. SUMMARY OF THE VALIDITY OF AMORTIZATION
The principle of using amortization as a method to remove non-
conforming billboards has won overwhelming support in the courts.
In addition to those cases cited elsewhere in this article, the list of
cases upholding amortization of outdoor advertising signs is quite
extensive.34 Decisions striking down amortization also are few. One
34. Naegele Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172, 177 (4th Cir. 1988)
(amortization valid but remand for determination of whether five and one-half year period was
reasonable); Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269, 1274 (4th
Cir. 1986) (amortization valid); National Adver. Co. v. City of Ashland, 678 F.2d 106, 107 (9th
Cir. 1982) (five-year amortization not preempted by Highway Beautification Act); Art Neon
Co. v. City & County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118, 122 (10th Cir. 1973) (five-year amortization
upheld); E.B. Elliott Adver. Co. v. Metro. Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141, 1155 (5th Cir. 1970)
(five-year amortization period valid); Sign Supplies of Texas, Inc. v. McConn, 517 F. Supp.
778, 787 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (amortization valid); Fisher Buick, Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 689
S.W.2d 350, 351-52 (Ark. 1985) (amortization valid); Donrey Communications Co. v. City of
Fayetteville, 660 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Ark. 1983) (four-year amortization reasonable); City of
Fayetteville v. McIlroy Bank & Trust Co., 647 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Ark. 1983) (seven year
amortization valid); National Adver. v. County of Monterey, 464 P.2d 33, 36 (Cal. 1970) (one-
year amortization valid); City of Salinas v. Ryan Outdoor Adver. Inc., 234 Cal. Rptr. 619, 623-
24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (amortization concept valid and five-year amortization period
reasonable); Veterans of Foreign Wars v. City of Steamboat Springs, 575 P.2d 835 (Colo. 1978)
(amortization valid); Mayor and Council of New Castle v. Rollins Outdoor Adver., Inc. 475
A.2d 355, 358 (Del. 1984) (amortization valid); Lamar Adver. Assoc. of East Florida, Ltd. v.
City of Daytona Beach, 450 So. 2d 1145, 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (ten-year amortization
valid); Webster Outdoor Adver. Co. v. City of Miami, 256 So.2d 556, 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972) (five-year amortization period valid); City of Doraville v. Turner Communication Corp.
233 S.E.2d 798, 801 (Ga. 1976) (amortization valid); Village of Skokie v. Walton on Dempster,
Inc., 456 N.E.2d 293, 296-97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (seven-year amortization upheld); Board of
Zoning Appeals v. Leisz, 702 N.E.2d 1026, 1027 (Ind. 1998) (amortization valid); State v.
National Co., 409 A.2d 1277, 1289 (Me. 1979) (five-year amortization period valid); Town of
Boothbay v. Nat’l Adver. Co., 347 A.2d 419, 425 (Me. 1975) (ten-month amortization upheld);
Donnelly Adver. Corp. of Maryland v. City of Baltimore, 370 A.2d 1127, 1134 (Md. 1977)
(amortization valid); Grant v. City of Baltimore, 129 A.2d 363, 370 (Md. 1957) (five-year
amortization valid); John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Adver., 339 N.E.2d 709 (Mass.
1975) (amortization upheld); Naegele Outdoor Adver. Co. of Minnesota v. Village of
Minnetonka, 162 N.W.2d 206, 213-14 (Minn. 1968) (three-year amortization valid); Beals v.
County of Douglas, 560 P.2d 1373, 1374 (Nev. 1977) (amortization upheld); Temple Baptist
Church, Inc. v. city of Albuquerque, 646 P.2d 565 (N.M. 1982) (amortization valid); Suffolk
Outdoor Adver. v. Town of southampton, 455 N.E.2d 1245, 1246 (N.Y. 1983) (amortization
valid and not preempted by Highway Beautification Act); Syracuse Sav. Bank v. Town of
DeWitt, 436 N.E.2d 1315, 1316 (N.Y. 1982) (four-year amortization valid); Modjeska Sign
Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 373 N.E.2d 255, 262-63 (N.Y. 1977) (amortization upheld); New York
State Thruway auth. v. Ashley Motor Court, 176 N.E.2d 566, 568-69 (N.Y. 1961) (instant
removal of a billboard as a safety hazard held valid); R.O. Givens, Inc. v. Town of Nags Head,
294 S.E.2d 388, 390 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (five and a half year amoritization period held
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is a decision by the Georgia Supreme Court invalidating the state’s
“bonus law” which is widely quoted for its lack of judicial reasoning
and hysterical tone. Georgia courts, to their eternal credit, have never
allowed taking or damaging private property without first paying;
therefore, this court stands ready to strike down any legislative
attempts to do so. The court held:
We believe this matter is important enough to justify the
following observations. Private property is the antithesis of
Socialism or Communism. Indeed, it is an insuperable barrier
to the establishment of either collective system of government.
Too often, as in this case, the desire of the average citizen to
secure the blessings of a good thing like beautification of our
highways, and their safety, blinds them to a consideration of
the property owner’s right to be saved from harm even by the
government. The thoughtless, the irresponsible, and the
misguided will likely say that this court has blocked the effort
to beautify and render our highways safer. But the actual truth
is that we have only protected constitutional rights by
condemning the unconstitutional method to attain such
desirable ends, and to emphasize that there is a perfect
constitutional way which must be employed for that purpose.
Those whose ox is not being gored by this Act might be
impatient and complain of this decision, but if this court
yielded to them and sanctioned this violation of the
Constitution we would thereby set a precedent whereby
tomorrow when the critics are having their own ox gored, we
would be bound to refuse them any protection. Our decisions
are not just good for today but they are equally valid
tomorrow.35 The Georgia Court reaffirmed its position in
Lamar Advertising of South Georgia v. City of Albany.36
reasonable); County of Cumberland v. Eastern Federal Corp., 269 S.E.2d 672, 675 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1980) (three-year amortization upheld); City of Houston v. Harris County Outdoor Adver.
Assoc., 732 S.W.2d 42, 49-50 (Tex. App. 1987); Lubbock Poster Co. v. City of Lubbock, 569
S.W.2d 935, 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (amortization valid); Ackerley Communications v. City
of Seattle, 602 P.2d 1177, 1180 (Wash. 1979) (amortization upheld); Markham Adver. Co. v.
State, 439 P.2d 248, 261 (Wash. 1968) (amortization valid).
35. State Highway Dep’t v. Branch, 152 S.E.2d 372, 374 (Ga. 1966).
36. Lamar, 389 S.E.2d 216 (Ga. 1990).
Washington University Open Scholarship
p357+Floyd.doc 01/04/01
374 Festschrift [Vol. 3:357
Likewise, the Colorado Supreme Court struck down a Denver
ordinance on the basis that it destroyed an entire business,
which exceeded the city’s powers.37 Thus, except in a few
states, the use of amortization has been found to be a
constitutionally valid technique to remove non-conforming
billboards.
V. OTHER REMOVAL TECHNIQUES
Forced removal under an amortization schedule is not the only
way for a community to reduce the number of billboards. The first, of
course, is a ban on the construction of new billboards. When
billboards are removed or destroyed for some reason they cannot be
replaced. Also, if a community has a ban on new billboards, they may
be able to negotiate with outdoor advertising companies to have them
remove existing billboards in return for being allowed to build some
new ones, so-called “cap and replace” provisions. Many communities
also make billboards a primary use of a lot. Thus, if the property
owner wants to develop it for another use, the billboards must be
removed as a condition for approval. These “vacant-lot” provisions
have been held to not be a taking.38
A. The Highway Beautification Act
It is ironic that the Highway Beautification Act, an act that was
passed to “promote the safety and recreational value of public travel
and to preserve natural beauty,” has served to protect billboards from
local sign removal ordinances.39 The 1965 act was supposed to
achieve two objectives: to prohibit the erection of new billboards,
except in genuine commercial or industrial areas, and to remove by
1970 all billboards that did not conform with the provisions of the
Act by 1970. In reality, of course, it has done neither.
37. Combined Communications Corp. v. City & County of Denver, 542 P.2d 79 (Colo.
1975).
38. Outdoor Systems v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1993); Naegele Outdoor v.
City of Lakeville, 532 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
39. 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1994).
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Despite the fact that twenty-two states were removing non-
conforming signs using amortization under the 1956 Bonus Act
designed to protect Interstate highways from billboard clutter, cash
compensation was made mandatory on the states in the 1965 act.
Although over two hundred twenty million dollars has been spent to
remove non-conforming billboards, a General Accounting Office
study concluded that the removal program was largely ineffective.40
The greatest impact of the Act has been to protect billboards from
removal under local regulatory ordinances. All billboards located
along protected highways, Interstate, Primary, and National Highway
System roads, cannot be removed except upon the payment of “just
compensation” for: (1) “The taking from the owner of all right, title,
leasehold, and interest in the sign, display, or device and; (2) The
taking from the owner of the real property on which the sign is
located the right to erect and maintain such signs, display, and
devices thereon.”41
The Federal Highway Administration interpreted this provision to
prohibit the removal of signs under a state’s police powers.42 Even so,
courts in several states ruled that cash compensation was not required
for billboards on protected roads that were removed for purposes
other than highway beautification.43 In 1978, however, the outdoor
advertising industry secured an amendment to the Act that mandated
cash compensation for all billboards that were removed, “regardless
of whether the sign was removed because of this section.”44
The practical result has been that the Highway Beautification Act
serves as a shield to protect billboards from removal by state and
local governments under their police powers.45 For example, after an
40. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE OUTDOOR ADVERTISING CONTROL PROGRAM
NEEDS TO BE REASSESSED (1985).
41. 23 U.S.C. § 131(g).
42. Vermont v. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. 606, 617 (D.Vt. 1974).
43. See, e.g., Modjeska Sign Studios v. Berle, 373 N.E.2d 255, 263 (N.Y. 1977) (removal
of billboards in state park area); Donnelly Adver. v. City of Baltimore, 370 A.2d 1127, 1134
(Md. 1977) (removal in urban renewal area). 
44. 23 U.S.C. § 131(g).
45. For cases invalidating local sign amortization provisions on this basis, see National
Adver. Co. v. City of Ashland, 678 F.2d 106 (9th Cir. 1982); Lamar Corp. v. City of
Mandeville, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14762 (E.D.La. 1995); Lamar-Orlando Outdoor Adver. v.
City of Ormond Beach, 415 S.E.2d 1312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); RHP Inc. v. City of Ithaca,
457 N.Y.S.2d 645 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); City of Ft. Collins v. Root Outdoor Advertising, 788
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eleven-year legal battle the City of Raleigh, North Carolina finally
was able to remove almost all billboards in the City— except those
that were protected by the Highway Beautification Act.
B. State Legislation Inhibiting Billboard Removal
The outdoor advertising industry is acknowledged to wield
political power far beyond its relative economic size would indicate.
This power is quite evident in anti-amortization laws that have been
passed in at least nineteen states. (In addition, several other states,
including Ohio and Virginia prohibit the forced discontinuance of
any non-conforming use.) Some of these laws were passed in
response to the 1978 amendment to the Highway Beautification Act;
the outdoor advertising industry using the argument that unless local
governments were prohibited from using amortization to remove
billboards, the state might be subject to a ten percent penalty in its
federal highway funds under the Act. Others were passed to block
billboard removal initiatives by local governments. For example,
after the Mesa and Tucson “vacant-lot” provisions were upheld in the
courts, the outdoor advertising was able to secure legislation
containing the following restriction on local governments in the state:
A municipality shall not require as a condition for a permit or
for any approval, or otherwise cause, an owner or possessor of
property to waive the right to continue an existing
nonconforming outdoor advertising use or structure without
acquiring the use or structure by purchase or condemnation
and paying just compensation unless the municipality, at its
option, allows the use or structure to be relocated to a
comparable site in the municipality with the same or a similar
zoning classification, or to another site in the municipality
acceptable to both the municipality and the owner of the use or
structure, and the use or structure is relocated to the other site.
The municipality shall pay for relocating the outdoor
advertising use or structure including the cost of removing and
P.2d 149 (Colo. 1990).
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constructing the new use or structure that is at least the same
size and height.46
A similar California law goes even further in its restrictions on
local governments:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no
advertising display which was lawfully erected anywhere
within this state shall be compelled to be removed, nor shall its
customary maintenance or use be limited, whether or not the
removal or limitation is pursuant to or because of his chapter
or any other law, ordinance, or regulation of any governmental
entity, without payment of compensation. . . The compensation
shall be paid to owner or owners of advertising display and the
owner or owners of the land upon which the display is located.
The requirement by a governmental entity that a lawfully erected
display be removed as a condition or prerequisite for the issuance of
continued effectiveness of a permit, license, or other approval for any
use, structure, development, or activity other than a display
constitutes a compelled removal requiring compensation under
section 5412, unless the permit license, or approval is required for the
construction of a building, or structure which cannot be built without
physically removing the display.47
CONCLUSION
Reducing billboard clutter in a community is a difficult task, and
one that is bitterly opposed by the outdoor advertising industry. One
way to do so, and perhaps the most effective way, is to ban the
construction of new billboards, thus reducing the number of
billboards as some are removed for development or other reasons.
Except in a few states, the amortization method of requiring non-
conforming billboards to be removed does not constitute a taking,
requiring the payment of cash compensation. Even so, the outdoor
advertising industry has been successful in a number of states in
46. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 9-462.02(B) (1996).
47. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 5412 and 5412.6 (1996).
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securing legislation that reduces, and in some cases severely curtails
or eliminates, the ability of local governments to use amortization or
other land use restrictions to remove non-conforming billboards.
Ironically, the Highway Beautification Act has provided the outdoor
advertising industry with its most effective shield from local
amortization ordinances.
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